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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the Korean problem, not as an aspect of the East-West conflict, but as a world order problem. The paper is one of a series commissioned by the World Order Models Project in its effort to stimulate research, education, dialogue, and political action which will contribute to a movement for a just world order. The first part of the paper briefly traces Korea's history up to August 1945. At that time the United States and Russia engaged in fierce maneuvers to carve out and extend their respective spheres of domination, thereby dividing the Korean nation into two countries which became hostile. Since that time North and South Korea have been robbed of their autonomy, have become satellites of the two major powers, have had their economies skewed, and have become preys to repressive regimes. The second part of the paper makes constructive suggestions for reducing tension between North and South Korea. Initiatives must emanate from the two major powers which are responsible for Korea's tragic plight, but some will have to be taken by the Korean people themselves. (Author/RM)

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Korea As A World Order Issue

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WORLD ORDER MODELS PROJECT
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This paper is one in a series of working papers commissioned by the World Order Models Project in its effort to stimulate research, education, dialogue, and political action which will contribute to a movement for a just world order. The papers will deal with major global problems facing humanity, and particularly vexing contemporary political, economic, social and cultural issues within an analytic and normative framework guided by the concepts and values of peace, economic well-being, social justice, and ecological stability. Special emphasis will be given to the necessity and feasibility of structural transformation of today's fragmented world in order to resolve these problems and achieve just world order results.

A Working Group of the World Order Models Project (WOMP) will use these papers in its new program aimed at publishing a statement in 1980 outlining the strategies for realizing just world order during this century. We invite interested individuals throughout the globe to respond to the various papers either directly to the individual authors or to WOMP. These communications will figure significantly in the WOMP Working Group's final statement. Where appropriate, the responses and critiques will be published in *Alternatives: A Journal of World Policy*.

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KOREA AS A WORLD ORDER ISSUE

Yoshikazu SAKAMOTO*

The paper views the Korean problem, not - as is commonly done - as an aspect of the East-West conflict (although it is a product of that conflict), but as a world-order problem. It briefly traces Korea's history upto that fateful day in August 1945, when the USA and the Soviets, engaged in fierce manoeuvres to carve out and extend their respective spheres of domination, divided arbitrarily - and almost casually - a peace-loving nation into two countries which became hostile and even went to war. In the process, both the halves have been robbed of their autonomy and made into satellites of their respective center states, both have had their economies skewed, and both have become preys to repressive regimes. The paper then goes on to make constructive suggestions for reducing tension between the two to pave the way for an eventual solution that would be in the interest of, and acceptable to, the Korean people. Initiatives must emanate from the two center states, which are responsible for Korea's tragic plight, but some will have to be taken by the Korean people themselves.

I. Introduction

What does it mean to discuss the Korean problem from a world-order perspective? In what respects does this perspective differ from, for instance, the area study approach.

Our concept of world order is explicitly oriented toward the major goal of realizing the values of peace, economic well-being, social justice and ecological balance. These values are not the product of abstract speculation. On the contrary, they stem from our actual involvement in, and thorough reflections on, the crucial problems confronting humankind. The relative priority assigned to each of these values, and the resulting agenda of public

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policy, will naturally vary according to the distinct social and political contexts within which specific issues arise. Thus, in dealing with the Korean problem from a world-order perspective, we are aware that we must fully consider what is peculiar to the Korean case in order to avoid the danger of mechanically applying universalistic diagnoses and prescriptions to individual situations. It is only through such critical examinations of concrete issues that we can translate the world-order values into just and workable policy guidelines, and thereby ensure the validity and relevance of the world-order approach to pressing issues.

At the same time, our concept of world order is characterized by the universality of its concern and perspective. This global outlook by no means leads us to bypass specific issues in specific contexts; on the contrary, it provides a normative and analytical framework within which we can deal with specific issues. To illustrate, the reason why we are concerned about the Korean problem is not necessarily because of its broad international implications for power politics, nor even because of its political ramifications for the superpowers in particular. The national interest considerations of the United States and the Soviet Union, however world-wide their impact, still remain partial and particularistic and hence do not warrant such universal concern. By contrast, our perspective calls for profound concern about problems even in faraway peripheries of the globe. In fact, it is precisely such problems which we believe do demand world-wide attention but are ignored by the rest of the world in the absence of a global perspective. The Korean problem affects us not because of its magnitude, but because of its nature. From our perspective, what counts is the qualitative rather than the quantitative dimensions of an issue. It is in this sense that we believe the case of Korea presents world-order issues which deserve global concern.

Although the scars of East-West armed conflict are more conspicuous in Korea than anywhere else, the Korean problem has become a peripheral issue because the world's main focus of interest has now shifted to North-South disparities. For more than two decades, the Korean issue was disposed of in the United Nations without substantive debate, through the use of a 'mechanical majority'. It was only as a result of active efforts by Koreans themselves that observers from the two Koreas were invited to the United Nations in 1973. Even then, the majority of member-states showed little real interest and were inclined toward noninvolvement in the Korean issue. They seemed to prefer not to be chilled by the cold-war situation of 1950 that remains frozen over the Korean peninsula. In view of the unprecedented large-scale involvement of the world organization in the Korean War, however, this inadequate response of the member-states today is quite unfortunate. By contrast, the world-order perspective requires us to squarely face the problem of the 'forgotten' people who stand in an historical

periphery, and who therefore tend to be put beyond the pale of contemporary interest.

II. The legacy of history

About five centuries ago, a feudal society emerged in Korea under the Lee dynasty. In 1910, Korea came under Japanese rule, from which she was liberated by the Allied Powers in 1945 at the time of Japan's surrender. The country's history has two significant implications for contemporary Korean issues.

(1) Because of its geopolitical vulnerability, Korea was continually exposed to threats from the Chinese mainland and/or the Japanese islands. Toward the end of the thirteenth century, for instance, Korea was conquered by the Mongols; from the end of the fourteenth century, it stood in a tributary relation to the Ming dynasty on the mainland. In the last decade of the sixteenth century, it was invaded twice by the Japanese; it was later invaded and dominated by the Manchus (who were to institute the Ching dynasty with which tributary relations were maintained); in the late nineteenth century, Korea was subjected to aggression by Japan and Ching in 1894–1895 and by Japan and Russia in 1904–1905, before finally coming under the Japanese colonial administration. In sum, the history of Korea is the history of a victim of recurrent invasions–a victim, too, who has not taken any aggressive actions against its neighbors. Throughout her history, Korea has remained a 'peace-loving' nation. In sharp contrast to Germany, another divided nation, Korea has no neighbors who should feel threatened if its two halves were reunited.

(2) The feudal societies of Korea and Japan had much in common in that both were hierarchically organized class (status) societies with profound Confucian imprints. The one big difference between them, however, was that whereas Japan was ruled by the warrior class, Korea was governed by the literati aristocracy. Koreans did not revere the martial superiority, which, in many other societies, was represented by the military aristocratic elite. This is one of the reasons why Korea and Japan responded quite differently to the Western impact toward the end of the nineteenth century. The Japanese perceived the West's impact from a strategic viewpoint, and quickly learned how to adopt Western technology, military or otherwise. The Korean elite, like the Chinese, prisoner of the cultural tradition of the literati, failed to recognize the political and military implications of Western technology. Thus, Korea was bound to be colonized, while Japan was not.

This comparison indicates how weak the militarist tradition was in Korea. Indeed, the present regime is the very first instance in the entire history of Korea when the military has played such a significant political role. Military rule is something alien and exogenous to the Korean soil. In fact, the present military regime is the legacy of the colonial rule of militarist Japan, and of the cold war during which the United States further militarized Korea. It may be no accident that Park was an officer of the Japanese Imperial army and, later, an officer of the Korean army under the US command.

How, then, was this nonaggressive and civilian-oriented nation transformed into an arena of nagging international tensions and domestic oppressions? This paper will argue that four factors account for the major structural constraints in contemporary Korea: the East–West conflict, developmental disparities, internal oppression, and reverse penetration. It may also be noted that these four factors are not necessarily peculiar to the Korean problem; they also constitute the problematique of the contemporary world as a whole.

III. East–west conflict

It has been pointed out that Korea was constantly engaged in a two-front defense and that failure to maintain this defense entailed a partition, formal or virtual, of the country. Partition in fact first took place at the time of the Sino–Japanese War (1894–1895), again during the Russo–Japanese War (1904–1905), and lastly at the end of the World War II when the Russians descended from the north and the Americans moved up from the south. Although some discussions on the future of Korea were held at the Cairo Conference in 1943 and at subsequent wartime conferences, the division of Korea was undertaken with no preparation by the United States, and probably none by the USSR either. Russian troops were already in Korea by the middle of August 1945 when the US, still away from Korea, proposed to draw a line of demarcation on the 38th parallel. This line was chosen simply because it had served as the boundary between divisions of the Japanese army. The postwar partition of Korea was originally intended to be a provisional arrangement. Neither the US nor the USSR had any pre-conceived long-term policy toward Korea. For them, Korea was not an independent actor that deserved separate treatment; it was a residual, to be taken into account only as a function of policy between the major powers. Indeed, the tragedy of Korea, unlike in the case of Germany, stemmed from lack of real interest on the part of the superpowers.

Some Americans may regret that their government ever agreed to let the Soviet Union occupy the northern half of the peninsula. As a matter of fact, however, because there were no American troops in Korea, nor any international agreement on the occupation of Korea, the Russians could have come much further south without difficulty at the time of Japan's surrender in August 1945. The fact that they stopped at the 38th parallel represents both Soviet restraint and American luck. In the words of President Truman (1955):

> The Army authorities, however, were faced with the insurmountable obstacles of both distance and lack of manpower. Even the 38th parallel was too far for any American troops to reach if the Russians had chosen to disagree. If we had been guided solely by how far north we could get our troops if there was opposition, the line would have had to be drawn considerably further south on the peninsula.... Of course there was no thought at the time other than to provide a convenient allocation of responsibility for the acceptance of the Japanese surrender.

The occupation and division of the country, initiated as a provisional expedient, came to be perpetuated in subsequent stages:

(1) The intensification of the cold war made it impossible to hold a unified election to set up a unified government. In 1948, the United Nations (where the United States prevailed) recognized the government in the south as 'the only lawful government', based on the election held in the south under UN supervision.

(2) The Korean War that broke out in June 1950 was something more than a mere extension of the US–USSR conflict. First, it is quite likely that the war was carefully prepared by North Korea in collaboration with USSR, but triggered off by the former – somewhat independently of what South Korea was actually doing in terms of recurrent border provocations, and even independently of the policy agenda of the Soviet Union (Simons, 1975). Second, albeit North Korea intended a war of national liberation and unification, her actions were accompanied by an exodus of North Koreans to the south and, frequently, by indiscriminate slaughter and kidnapping of the 'reactionary elements' in the south while under the occupation of the North Koreans. (Probably similar acts were committed by the South Koreans while occupying the north.) Korea thus ended up with a particularly acrimonious national division and extensive repression. The cold war, originally imposed on Korea from the outside, irreversibly led to its indigenization. Table 1 below shows the cost of this war in human lives alone.

(3) When the United States concluded the Mutual Assistance Pact in 1953, she formally committed herself to the 'defense' of South Korea. It may be noted, however, that because none of its provisions specified how long the treaty would remain in force, the implication was that the treaty

Table I

Casualties of the Korean War (1950–1953)

	Civilians		Military personnel		Others	
	North's	South's	North's	South's	Chinese volunteers in North	UN military personnel in South
Killed	406 900	373 599	294 151	227 748	184 128	36 813
Wounded	1 594 000	229 652	225 849	717 083	715 872	114 816
Missing	680 000†	387 744*	91 206‡	43 572	21 836‡	6 198
Total	2 680 000	990 995	611 206	988 403	921 836	157 827

*Missing 303,312. Taken to North 84,532.
†Refugees to South.
‡Prisoners of war
Source: *Toitsu Chosen Shimbun*, 27 June, 1970, cited in Hayashi (1971).

could be denounced whenever the United States saw fit. This implicit 'escape hatch' can be construed as a reflection of the Americans' bitter experience during the Korean War, which the US could not win despite the enormous cost involved (Sakamoto, 1968). But, as a whole, this act of formalizing the commitment helped to institutionalize the division of Korea.

(4) General Park's junta successfully staged a coup in May 1961, one year after the Student Revolution that had overthrown the Rhee regime. Reacting with a sense of crisis, North Korea concluded Friendship and Assistance Treaties with China and the USSR in July. The United States began to send more troops to Vietnam, and gradually stepped up its prosecution of the war up to the bombing of North Vietnam. While postwar reconstruction was giving way to high economic growth in Japan, the United States urged Japan to take over at least the economic and financial burden of Korea's defense. The result was the Japan–South Korea Basic Treaty signed in June 1965, with the purpose of normalizing diplomatic relations between the two countries and providing South Korea with $500 million worth of grants and credit. Japan thereby closed a twenty-year period of postwar political retreat and self-restraint, and emerged as a major party to the cold war in East Asia. This development inevitably invited a strong negative response from China, the USSR and North Korea.

(5) Also in 1965, the United States asked South Korea to send troops to South Vietnam, both in order to reduce her own burden, particularly in terms of manpower, and to make the war appear less of an American war. South Korea agreed to dispatch troops, thereby deciding, in effect, to build a second front, in Vietnam against North Korea. Fortunately, North Korea did not respond in kind in Vietnam, and hence averted the possibility of

escalating the Vietnam war into another Korean War. South Korea then began to accumulate foreign exchange through US procurements in Korea, including remittances from Korean soldiers in Vietnam. In the early 1950s, Japan had overcome its economic crisis, thanks to the booming export market derived from expanded US procurement during the Korean war, which deepened the resentments of the Korean people. Now South Korea in turn became one of the greatest beneficiaries of the Vietnam war.

(6) In 1971, in the midst of mounting conflict in Vietnam, North Korea renewed its alliance with both China and the USSR for another decade. In 1975, when the Saigon regime collapsed and the United States withdrew her troops from Vietnam, tensions on the Korean peninsula mounted to a near-critical point.

In sum, although the division of Korea was originally intended to be no more than a provisional arrangement, it has been perpetuated with no end in sight. Furthermore, the division of Korea has come to be inseparably intertwined with other manifestations of the East-West conflict elsewhere in Asia and throughout the world. It is in this twofold sense that the East-West conflict gave rise to an increasingly irreversible split in Korea. It goes without saying that this division constitutes the most fundamental and crucial obstacle to conflict-resolution on the Korean peninsula.

There have been continuing nationalist movements to resist Korea's externally dictated division; profound aspirations for national unification underlie these efforts. The fact that a unified Korea has not jeopardized the security of her neighbors in the past makes Koreans all the more convinced of the legitimacy of their national aspirations. Further, the dispersion and displacement of innumerable families across the 38th parallel helps to keep alive a keen popular interest in the unification issue. Understandably, therefore, neither the North Korean government nor the South Korean government has ever discarded the symbol of 'unification'. Under the emerging détente between the United States and China in 1972, North and South agreed to initiate talks in pursuit of unification. Unfortunately, they are still locked in a stalemate.

IV. Developmental disparities

The externally imposed division of Korea not only gave rise to the internal conflict between North and South Korea, but also created a structure of international ties which turned both North and South Korea into dependent satellites of the center states.

(1) Almost from the beginning of the postwar period, South Korea was bound to depend on the United States. Under Rhee's rule, dependence provided a framework mainly for postwar 'relief and reconstruction'. Under Park, dependence became more structurally geared to development. As Table 2 below shows, during the Park regime's first five years, it depended on the United States for nearly one-third of its total budget. US contribution to South Korea's military expenditures formed 95·1% in the year 1961, and 64·8% in 1965. Moreover, these funds do not include expenditures for the US troops stationed in South Korea. The continuing cold war between the superpowers put South Korea in a position of unmistakable military dependence, and hence financial dependence, on the United States.

The main pillar of US nonmilitary aid to South Korea was surplus food. This form of aid further aggravated Korea's dependence on the United States by discouraging, and sometimes even destroying, Korea's own agriculture, which was characterized by low productivity (in part, as a consequence of halfway land reform).

Thus, the so-called 'aid' helped to increase the number of peasants who suffered from starvation during the off-crop season. Whereas Korea had been a 'food-exporting' colony under Japanese rule, the country was now transformed into a food-importing country.

With the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea in 1965, the latter began to reduce its economic dependence on the United States, whose role was partly taken over by Japan. For instance, while her public loans, commercial loans, and direct investment in South

Table 2

South Korea's fiscal dependence on US
(in percentage)

Year	Total budget		Defense expenditure	
	Domestic source	American source	Domestic source	American source
1961	60·8	39·2	4·9	95·1
1962	69·2	30·8	27·6	72·4
1963	65·3	34·7	30·0	70·0
1964	64·7	35·2	37·2	62·8
1965	65·8	34·2	35·2	64·8
1966	75·1	24·9	35·9	64·1
1967	80·9	19·1	48·8	51·2
1968	87·9	12·1	57·9	42·1
1969	93·0	7·0	73·4	26·6
1970	94·9	5·1	83·0	16·1

Source: *Seoul Kyungjae Shinmoon*, 28 May, 1970, cited in Hayashi (1971).

Korea generally showed a conspicuous increase after the late 1960s, Japan had surpassed the United States as the largest single source of direct investment by 1971. As for the loans, the amount of debt service increased year by year, so that by 1973, more than half of the new loans was used for amortization—a fact which also deepened the aggravating dependence on Japan. This is well brought out by Table 3 and 4.

From the end of the 1960s, South Korea's largest trading partner of manufactured goods became Japan in place of the United States; the ratio between

Table 3

US and Japan's investments in South Korea
(in thousand US dollars)

Year	Total	From USA	From Japan
1967	13 902	8 034	1 269
1968	13 458	1 815	6 170
1969	37 541	6 524	19 936
1970	58 860	31 471	20 683
1971	32 869	8 079	23 393
1972	125 022	34 212	81 863
1973	268 292	7 235	255 002
1974	143 238	28 406	101 150
1975	201 457	8 474	102 768
Total	894 639	134 250	612 234
(%)	100	17·5	66·5

Source: Economic Planning Board: Major Statistics of Korean Economy, 1976.

Table 4

Foreign loans and debt service
(in million US dollars)

Year	(A) *New Arrival*	(B) *Debt Service* (Installment and interest)	*B/A × 100* (%)
1970	482·0	170·5	35·4
1971	648·6	215·7	33·3
1972	650·9	315·0	48·4
1973	712·9	413·7	58·0
1974	932·7	545·1	58·4
1975	1 405·1	568·0	40·4

Source: Economic Planning Board: Major Statistics of Korean Economy, 1976.

Korea's exports to Japan and her imports from Japan reached 1:6·25 in 1968. This gap between exports and imports indicates the system of vertical division of labor that emerged anew between the two, with Japan exporting capital goods and South Korea exporting agricultural and labor-intensive products. Although the export-import ratio drastically decreased by 1973, the total deficit more than doubled (Refer to Table 5).

One device adopted by South Korea in order to fill this gap was the 'free trade zone' (FTZ), which simultaneously keeps wages low, on the one hand, and provides special favors to export industries, on the other. The FTZ provides investment from abroad with an exceptionally favorable

Table 5

Japan-South Korean trade seen from South Korea
(in million US dollars)

Year	Export (A)	Import (B)	Trade deficit (B—A)	B/A
1966	66·2 (26·2)*	293·7 (39·9)	227·5 (48·8)	4·43
1967	84·7 (26·4)	443·0 (44·5)	358·3 (53·0)	5.23
1968	99·7 (21·9)	623·9 (42·6)	524·2 (52·0)	6.25
1969	133·3 (21·4)	753·8 (41·3)	620·4 (51·6)	5·65
1970	234·3 (28·0)	809·2 (40·7)	574·9 (50·0)	3·45
1971	261·9 (24·5)	953·7 (39·8)	691·7 (52·1)	3·64
1972	407·8 (25·1)	1 031·0 (40·9)	623·2 (69·4)	2·50
1973	1 241·5 (38·5)	1 726·9 (40·8)	485·3 (47·8)	1·4
1974	1 380·1 (30·9)	2 620·5 (38·2)	1 240·3 (51·8)	1·89
1975	1 292·9 (25·4)	2 433·6 (33·5)	1 140·7 (52·0)	1·88

*Figures in parenthesis refer to the proportion to the total.
Source: The Bank of Korea: Economic Statistic Yearbook.

infrastructure – land, water, electricity, factory buildings at low cost, as well as tax and financial privileges[1]. Around 1969, large-scale Japanese investments began pouring into the FTZs, mainly in such industries as textiles, electric appliances, electronics, machines and metals (including steel). Japanese investors have thus been taking advantage of Korea's low wage levels – approximately one-third of the payscale in Japan. The FTZ and similar special arrangements made by the South Korean government also facilitate investment by allowing Japanese businessmen to relocate pollution-emitting industries from their own country, where government regulations and public pressures have increasingly created an unfavorable and unprofitable climate for these industries[2]. The FTZ is a typical example of an *enclave* economy. The natural product of such arrangements is a dual-structured economy, in which the link between export industry and domestic industry is almost totally missing. Due to the rapid expansion of exports and imports, South Korea's GNP shows a spectacularly high rate of growth, somewhat around or above 10% since 1966. But domestic industry, isolated from the external trade, has remained stagnant due to high interest rates and low wage levels. According to a survey conducted by the Korean Trade Association, the [illegible] standard of living has been lowered because the soaring price of consumer goods has surpassed the rise of nominal wages. The gap between wage rates in export and domestic industries has been constantly widening. Even the progovernment daily, *Hankook Nilbo*, pointed out that 'Under the pretext of preventing weakening of external competitiveness of the Korean economy and of putting the price of commodities under control, the government authorities and the management of corporations have taken no step to improve the low wage level[3].' (See Table 6 below).

Thus, the privileged export industry and the capital invested in that sector have entered into a corrupt alliance with the political elite, while the masses, workers and peasants earn wages which are systematically held down. Little wonder that economic disparities among the population continuously grow wider.

As an enclave economy, South Korea's economic structure resembles that of Latin America in many respects. However, because South Korea is

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[1] For a detailed account, see 'Free Trade Zones and Industrialization of Asia', *AMPO: Japan-Asia Quarterly Review*, Special Issue, 1977, Pacific Asia Resources Centre, Tokyo.

[2] Yastugi (1976), a leading promoter of political 'cooperation' between Japan and South Korea, in his draft proposal submitted to the Conference of Japan–Korea Cooperation Committee in April 1970, stated: 'In such industries as steel, aluminium, electronics and plastic, development is approaching to a ceiling in Japan due to the limits to the utilization of coastal area and to the regulations for environmental protection. . . . I would suggest that the Committee investigate whether South Korea is in a position to share the burden in collaboration with Japan.'

[3] *Mainichi Shimbun*, 24 November, 1977.

Table 6

Index number of wages and salaries

		1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Index no. of wages and salaries	Nominal wages	100·0	119·2	137·6	150·8	204·5	259·3
	Consumer prices	100·0	112·3	125·6	129·5	160·1	202·2
	Real wages	100·0	106·1	109·6	116·4	127·7	128·3
Engel's coefficient		40·6	41·4	41·3	41·8	44·2	44·2

Source: Economic Planning Board, *Major Statistics of Korean Economy*, 1976.

short of exportable raw materials, she is forced to rely all the more heavily on her cheap skilled labor as a profitable and 'exportable' national resource. Labor is exported not only indirectly, in the form of labor-intensive export goods, but also directly, in the form of more than 20 000 skilled and semiskilled foreign workers, who are employed in the Middle East oil-producing countries. Hence the government's systematic suppression of the labor movement, on the one hand, and the unbelievably large investment by individual families in extremely competitive education, on the other.

(2) The structure of dependence is also observable in North Korea's relations to the USSR. The northern part of Korea had been more industrialized than the southern part since the days of Japanese colonialism. Later, under the Russian occupation, North Korea adopted programs of industrialization and agricultural collectivization along Soviet-style lines, as part of a thoroughgoing social revolution. However, the Korean War dealt a heavy blow to North Korea's economy, as Table 7 below demonstrates. Furthermore, the war was fought mainly with arms supplied by the Soviet Union, and was followed by a period of reconstruction in which the Soviet Union, with other socialist countries in tow, played a major role (see Table 8). In other words, the conflict between the two super-powers has in itself contributed to making Korea as a whole all the more dependent on them.

Precisely because of the constant threat of aggravating dependence, North Korea made every effort to attain self-reliance, best exemplified by Kim Il Sung's stress on the idea of 'Juche' (self-reliance). The extent of this effort is illustrated by the fact that North Korea, which is not particularly suited to agriculture, achieved self-sufficiency in the agricultural sector in the latter part of 1960s-an especially laudable achievement in view of the fact that South Korea, even with its more advantageous natural endowment, failed to attain that goal until very recently.

In sharp contrast to China under Mao, North Korea has given importance to technical experts and intellectuals who could lay the foundation for an

Table 7

Decrease in North Korea's industrial and agricultural production due to the Korean war
(in percentages)

	1949	1953
Total industrial product	100	64
Power	100	26
Fuels	100	11
Metallurgy	100	10
Machine	100	124
Chemicals	100	22
Construction materials	100	36
Marine products	100	24
Lumber	100	26
Total agricultural product	100	76
Grain	100	88
Vegitable	100	58
Cotton	100	23
Fruit	100	72
Cocoon	100	58

Source: Ko Soong Hyo: *Chosen Shakaishugi Keizai Ron* (Korean Specialist Economy), (Tokyo: Minerva Shobo) 1973, p. 38.

Table 8

Aids to the 3-year reconstruction program

Country	Period	Amount (Ruble)	
USSR	1954–1955	1,000 million	Grant
China	54–1957	800 (Yuan)	Grant
Czekoslovakia	54–1960	113	
E. Germany	54–1957	217	
Poland	54–1956	164·4	
Romania	54–1956	90	
Bulgaria	54–1955	20	
Hungary	54–1960	15·7	
Mongol			

Source: Japanese Foreign Winistry: *Chosen Binran*, 1960, cited in Hayashi (1971).

autonomous North Korea based on industrial development, especially through heavy industry. This policy has brought about steady improvements in the standard of living, as indicated by the estimates of national income, shown in Tables 9 and 10.

Having chosen this industrial development path, however, North Korea has put itself in a vulnerable position in terms of petroleum supplies, for which it must depend totally on external sources, although it has attempted to diversify this dependence. Thus, North Korea has recently worked out an

Table 9

Increase in industrial and agricultural production and national income in North Korea (in percentages)*

	Industry	Agriculture	National income
1946–1949	337	140	209
1953–1956	285	139	220
1956–1960	348	140	214
1960–1970	330	149	—
1970–1975	220	123	170

*The figures show the ratio of increase to each base year which is represented by 100%.
Source: Nishikawa, Jun: 'Kitachosen no Keizai Hatten (Economic Development of North Korea) I,' *Sekai*, No. 363, February issue, 1976.

Table 10

National income per capita (Won)

1946	50
1949	104
1953	73
1956	160
1960	343
1962	417
1963	467 N
1966	500
1974	1940

Source: Yamamoto, Tsuyoshi: *Chosen o Kangaeru* (Thoughts on Korea), Aki Shobo: Tokyo, 1976.

arrangement to obtain oil from China, instead of relying amost exclusively on the USSR as before.

North Korea received an enormous amount of military assistance from China at the time of the Korean War, including manpower assistance in the form of 'volunteers'. But China is not sufficiently strong as an economic power to make North Korea a dependent satellite. Besides, in view of Korea's long dependence on China in the past, and Russia's interference with North Korea in the postwar period, it is no wonder that North Korea is now so strongly determined to attain self-reliance. Accordingly, to Kim Il Sung (1976), North Korea today is more than 70% self-sufficient in the supply of raw materials.

However, some obstacles to North Korean self-sufficiency still remain. One is the energy supply. Another is the need to improve local technology by importing know-how from abroad, in return for which North Korea will have to increase its share of exports in the competitive international

market—not an easy task. Finally, North Korea, like China, cannot be exempt from natural disasters which affect agricultural production. All in all, these factors may have caused the recent serious shortage of foreign exchange. Nonetheless, despite these difficulties, North Korea remains jealous of her capabilities for attaining maximum self-reliance and self-sufficiency—precisely because she perceives the danger of having to depend on neighboring big powers.

V. Internal oppression

The East–West conflict did not only give rise to the division of Korea and to the dependence of each half on a rival superpower, thereby reinforcing the larger international bipolarization. It also led to the bipolarization of the internal political systems in both South and North. Hence the tendency to perpetuate the two types of authoritarian regime.

When Korea was liberated from Japanese rule, three streams of nationalism emerged—rightist, centrist, and leftist. The right wingers had been based in Western countries during the colonial period and were represented by Rhee Syngman, who was to become the first president of South Korea. The centrist group, consisting of social democratic nationalists, had been pursuing activities for Korea's independence from bases in China and Russia. The leftists were communists who had also had bases of operation in the USSR and China, including Manchuria, where Kim Il Sung had been engaged in anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare. Then came liberation in 1945. In the US-occupied southern part of Korea, the centrists commanded the broadest support of the people, and initially of the American military government itself. The centrists also had supporters in the northern part of the country. Had it not been for the prolonged and divided occupation by the two superpowers, a unified Korea could have emerged under the leadership of the centrist group. However, the East–West conflict turned world politics into a tight bipolar system. When the 'nonaligned' third force (the British Commonwealth nations and Arab–Asian emerging nations) lost its potential to exercise an independent initiative in the international arena (including the United Nations), Korea's centrist third force also began to lose ground on the domestic level to extremists on both sides. The American military government then shifted its support to Rhee Syngman. International bipolarization and domestic bipolarization went hand in hand, reinforcing one another. Immediately after Rhee's downfall in 1960, centrist forces came to the fore, which, unfortunately, did not have power to change the structure

of division and dependence. That turmoil was followed by Park's successful coup in 1961.

Park's regime

Kim Dae Jung, who ran for the presidency in 1971 and obtained 45% of the popular vote despite systematic obstructions by Park's government, has listed three points as the salient features of Park's regime: (1) military rule; (2) government by 'intelligence', and (3) shrewd opportunism.

We have already observed that Korean political culture has no tradition of warrior rule. Thus it was all the more difficult for Park's junta, a product of East–West conflict originally external to Korea, to legitimate its power in terms of indigenous values. Hence the tendency to rely on naked power. In the words of Kim Dae Jung (1973):

> It is based on the idea that might is all that counts, and that whoever is not your friend is your enemy. Notions of a 'rival' or an 'adversary' do not exist in their mind. All political parties and mass media critical to them must be exterminated – a mechanical application of the military way of thinking to politics.

'Government by intelligence' refers to the fact that practically all key persons in Park's regime, including Park himself and former premier Kim Jun Bil, among others, are former intelligence officers; that the KCIA, which is thought to consist of 20 000 to 40 000 personnel, holds the most crucial position in the government and even prevails over the military and the police, and that the regime relies heavily on the use of a systematically manipulated information flow. This system depends on the press and other mass media as well as on an extensive network of informants, the abuse of judiciary power, the use and threat of torture, and on a regimented education for anticommunist indoctrination. In short, this is a system of total war by 'intelligence' waged against the Korean people themselves[4]. While the military regime may appropriately be seen as a legacy of the colonial rule of militarist Japan, the KCIA is heir to the American type of 'garrison–state', which began to undermine US democracy in the 1950s around the time of the Korean War. This combination of militarism and intelligence constitutes a machinery of violence which aims to institutionalize division and disparities at the international level, and repression and inequity at the domestic level.

'Shrewd opportunism', as Kim Dae Jung calls it, also reflects fundamental instability, international and internal. For instance, ever since the coup in

[4] A moving testimony to the oppression under Park's regime is T.K.: *Letters from South Korea*, International Documentation North America, Inc., New York, or Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo. For a more scholarly study, see Sunoo (1976).

1961 Park has consistently taken repressive measures against the student movement, which had earlier overthrown Rhee's regime with the hope of promoting 'rapprochement' between South and North and 'national unification'. As the international environment changed with the US–China rapprochement, however, Park made a turnabout in 1972. Seeking to divert public discontent, he called for a 'South–North talk'. However, while proceeding to meet with delegates from the North, Park took harsher measures than ever to eliminate dissident voices. A state of emergency was declared in December 1971, martial law was imposed in October 1972, and a series of Presidential Emergency Directives have been issued since the beginning of 1974. As a result, the Constitution and due process of law have been virtually suspended, and human rights have been violated with still less restraint on government power. But mounting oppression at home is not compatible with efforts to reduce tension abroad. In fact, North Korea refused to continue talks with the South, insisting that the increasing oppression of democratic forces in South Korea be terminated in order to create an atmosphere of bona fide dialogue between North and South. As a means of retaining power in a rapidly changing international environment, however, these incongruent measures taken by Park appear as manifestations of political 'shrewdness'.

Kim's regime

Information on North Korea's regime is difficult to get, which in itself is a problem. On the basis of the available though highly limited information, however, we can identify three salient features of Kim Il Sung's regime.

First, the postwar history of North Korea's political elite has been characterized by a bitter struggle within the Party. Many party leaders, who failed to win, lost not only their political but their physical lives. In part, the struggle in Korea (including South Korea) stemmed from the political culture of feudal society, where familial and provincial ties were important. The divisiveness of this struggle was also due, in part, to the fact that during the colonial period the Korean nationalist movement had no unified base of operations. The movement was kept alive in many different parts of the world with little effort at coordination and mutual cooperation. When the nationalist leaders returned home from exile in 1945, they did not have a nucleus around which an overwhelming majority of their supporters could be rallied. There was no single nationalist movement—only a multiplicity of nationalist movements. Even within the Communist group in North Korea, there were at least four factions from the outset, working for independence respectively from Moscow, Yenan (China), Manchuria, and underground in

Korea. After a long, bitter struggle for power and ideological legitimacy among the four groups, the third faction (which had fought partisan warfare against the Japanese in Manchuria, under the leadership of Kim Il Sung) prevailed over the other three.

Second, the political regime in North Korea is a system of highly patriarchal loyalty centered on Kim Il Sung. It is not difficult to detect here a legacy of the Confucian father-image of political leadership. (In this context it appears especially significant that Park, an ex-officer, has not succeeded in acquiring a patriarchal charisma comparable to that of Kim Il Sung.) Although Kim Il Sung is undoubtedly one of the most outstanding political leaders in the world today, it is hard to ignore the excessive cult of patriarchal personality which can be discerned in North Korea's political language. This cult resembles Stalinism, but has a stronger patriarchal-familial flavor. While Stalin did not designate a family member as his political heir, North Korean leaders seem to be seriously considering the possibility of transmitting power to a member of the same kin.

Third, and closely related to the second point, is the growth of a rigid bureaucracy. Unlike China, North Korea adopted the Soviet type of industrialization program, which necessitates and even encourages the emergence of a large technocracy. Moreover, the Korean war and the constant tension on the Korean peninsula have called for a continuing nationwide mobilization which has tended to create an overweening military bureaucracy.

The inefficiency and rigidity, which derive from this Korean version of Stalinism, have been frequently overcome or mitigated by Kim Il Sung's astute realism and flexibility. It is said that he often goes out to the country incognito to maintain direct contact with peasants. His keen sense of realism should be considered an unquestionable credit to him. On the other hand, the fact that he has to play such a role points to the *systemic* deficiency inherent in his authoritarian regime.

Evidently, the external threat which confronts the North Koreans makes it extremely difficult for them to eliminate authoritarian rigidity. Constant pressures come from the south – South Korea, the United States and Japan – but pressures also seem to come from the north – the USSR and China, expecially as side effects of the Sino-Soviet conflict. The 'isolationist' stance of North Korea is a natural response to the stern international environment in which it has been placed over the last three decades.

VI. Penetration in reverse

So far, we have discussed primarily the external impacts which have been brought to bear on South and North Korea. But, far from being mere objects of foreign influence, they are also capable of generating foreign impacts of their own – though to a lesser degree, of course. Under present conditions of big-power rivalries, a satellite can exert influence over the dominant center state by penetrating part of its power elite, if not its entire power structure. Limited reverse penetration is particularly noticeable in center states within the liberal-democratic West. Even in the Communist world, similar reverse penetration seems to have taken place, perhaps not at the level of inaccessible political elites, but at least at a level that the public can discern. The anti-Soviet demonstration staged by Chinese students in Moscow, or the anti-Chinese literature distributed by Albanian diplomats in Peking, fall in this category.

Occasionally, the reverse penetration in the West takes a clandestine and sinister form, involving part of the political elite in a transnational network of corruption. Perhaps the best example of the structured corruption produced by Park's regime is the transnational political-business complex which, at the Japanese end, comprises the right-wing 'pro-Park' faction within the conservative government party, and which has its counterpart in the Park regime, at the Korean end. In the absence of regular changes of government based on a two-party system, it is quite difficult to produce indisputable evidence on how this complex works. However, there have been incessant leaks of somewhat fragmentary information which seem to indicate that the complex was involved in the Lockheed transactions, for example, and also in the subway construction project in Seoul (which was financed through a public loan from Japan). This particular political-business complex seems to have emerged around 1965, when Japan agreed to provide South Korea with $500 million as part of the arrangement for normalizing diplomatic relations. The complex apparently served Park's interest by ensuring support from the pro-Park faction in the Japanese conservative party. Success in Japan probably promoted Park and his entourage to build a similar network at a later stage to conduct operations in the United States. Bribing Congressmen (through agents such as Park Tong Sun) and South Korean diplomats in Washington is a case in point. As long as such incidents were regarded as the 'Korean problem', they failed to provoke strong reactions. However, once the American public began to realize that the issue was an 'American problem', one which concerned the political ethics of the

American political elite, this corruption was taken quite seriously. The fact that such activities are no longer considered a mere 'Korean problem' reflects the depth of reverse penetration within the US power structure.

In essence, this unsavory alliance works through bribes, offered by agents of Park's regime, to insure favorable aid or commitments from the Japanese or the US government. These commitments then channel funds into the hands of an elite group in South Korea. Finally, a sizable portion of these funds is paid back to the Japanese or American end of the complex. Japan seems more vulnerable to this kind of reverse penetration than the United States, as her interest in South Korea is primarily economic. Japan's investments and loans have increasingly become dominant factors in South Korea's market, and, most importantly, Japan has been ruled by the same conservative party for nearly 30 years with little sign of change in the foreseeable future.

In addition to bribery, the Park regime has employed another form of reverse penetration: the abduction of Korean political dissenters from foreign countries, in violation of the latters' rights of national jurisdiction. In 1967, KCIA agents kidnapped several Koreans from West Germany on the charge that they were engaged in espionage activities in the interest of Communist countries. Kim Dae Jung was abducted from Japan in 1973. Some informed people doubt whether this latter abduction could have been carried out without some form of acquiescence, if not collusion, on the part of Japanese government agents.

In brief, it appears that when major powers have close interactions with an undemocratic satellite regime, the former are likely to be affected and corrupted at the heart of their power structure. This problem of reverse penetration is observable today in many interactions between the dominant center states and their satellites.

VII. Strategy for peaceful change

As the tragic dilemmas of postwar Korea originated above all from the nation's division, imposed from the outside as a result of East–West conflict, the most crucial and urgent need today is to reduce the tension between South and North Korea.

1. *Tension reduction*

The initiative for reducing tension should come from the outside for two reasons: first, because the measures which originally led Korean society to be divided and subordinated were taken by external powers, and, second, because the mutual distrust and hostility between North and South have by now become so deep-seated that we can hardly expect them to inaugurate a meaningful dialogue in the near future. The primary responsibility for peacemaking should rest with those who instigated the cold war.

Such an initiative can and should be assumed by the United States, among others. President Carter's decision to begin withdrawing American troops from South Korea is most welcome. However, the withdrawal of troops will bring about positive results only if it is coupled with additional steps to reduce international tension.

First, withdrawal should not mean mere replacement of American by South Korean soldiers. This will only promote the build-up and modernization of South Korea's own arsenal, with no effect on tension reduction. We should not delude ourselves by naively hoping that US withdrawal will automatically serve the purpose of building peace in East Asia. The point must be emphasized. President Carter's initial decision to withdraw American troops served to make the Park government realize it could no longer take the cold war for granted. However, when US officials subsequently stated that the Administration would favor the modernization of South Korea's armed forces, Korean and Japanese officials construed these remarks to mean that the US cared less about peace-building on the Korean peninsula than about reducing her financial and military burden.

Second, the pull-out should be combined with simultaneous diplomatic action toward rapprochement with North Korea. In fact, when the US government declared its plan to withdraw troops, North Korea met this announcement with a series of indications that it intended to develop direct contact with the United States. So far US remains reluctant to go any further, but this is hardly the way to generate momentum toward tension reduction. The United States does not need to extend diplomatic recognition to North Korea immediately. More important at this stage is the opportunity to encourage revision of American perceptions of North Korea through closer contact and exchange. By the same token, North Koreans' image of the West is also likely to be revised in the course of more extensive interaction with the United States, particularly since the North's perceptions have been distorted by a long period of isolation from the outside world. Hopefully, then, increasing interactions between the two parties will lead to a significant

and reciprocal rectification of some of the inaccurate picture that each has of the other.

A similar initiative for rapprochement with North Korea should be expected from Japan. In fact, Japan has an even greater stake than the United States in reducing tension and achieving peace on the Korean peninsula. Nevertheless, Japan's conservative government has shown no sign of reconsidering its cold-war approach to the Korean issue. The right wing, pro-Park faction of the conservative party, raised a strong voice against the withdrawal of US troops, and the mainstream of the ruling party followed suit. Because most Japanese conservative politicians share a cold-war mentality, it is not suprising that they should be preoccupied with the 'worst case' result of US troop withdrawal – that is, the invasion of South Korea by North Korea. What they fail to do is explore the possibility of heading off this worst-case prospect in advance through diplomatic accommodation. This failure cannot be explained solely in terms of anticommunist cognitive and psychic constraints, since quite a few of the staunchest anti-communists in the world have taken diplomatic initiatives for détente. The failure apparently can be traced to the strong objection of President Park, whose regime – through the aforementioned transnational political-business complex – has captured a stronghold in the Japanese power structure.

South Korea is trying to block rapprochement between the United States/Japan and North Korea by refusing to be 'bypassed' in the development of such direct contacts. Of course, resumption of direct talks between North and South Korea is the most desirable course of all, if feasible. Unfortunately, however, neither the South nor the North appears ready to move in that direction. South Korea will doubtless benefit from US and Japanese attempts to encourage greater flexiblity on North Korea's part inasmuch as these will promote eventual direct contact with South Korea. What is even better is South Korea's own initiative – in other words, a policy of relaxing *its* rigidity in order to induce its adversary to do the same.

Some US officials have suggested a cross-cutting recognition – whereby the USSR and China would recognize South Korea, and the US and Japan would recognize North Korea – coupled with international guarantees of the security and neutrality of both Koreas. But this is the kind of arrangement which should be worked out at a later stage, in accord with the will of North and South after direct talks have begun.

Another change that must occur concerns the role of the United Nations in Korea. Korea is the only instance in which the UN clearly took the side of the West against the East by force of arms. As long as the UN remains the enemy of North Korea, it will be in no position to take an active role in building peace within East Asia. Therefore, as its first step, the world organization should dissolve the UN Command in Korea as soon as possible.

This would free the Secretary-General of the United Nations from historical contraints and enable him to act as a peacemaker between the North and South. If the UN succeeds in gaining North Korea's confidence, an arrangement could be worked out, if the parties so desired, in which a UN peacekeeping force could patrol the demilitarized zone along the 38th parallel after US troops have been withdrawn.

All the actions recommended above – US troop withdrawal; increased communications between the United States and Japan, on the one hand, and North Korea, on the other; and the dissolution of the UN Command in Korea – are directed, not only toward the creation of a more favorable international climate over the Korean peninsula, but also, more specifically, toward arms reduction on both sides of the 38th parallel.

It is estimated that in recent years the defense expenditures of South Korea have consumed approximately 5% of GNP, and those of North, more than 15%. (The figure for South Korea does not include the cost of stationing US troops there.) In terms of the ratio between military expenditures and GNP, then, the Korean peninsula is one of the most heavily armed regions of the world.

Disarmament in the South and the North will in itself serve to mitigate distrust and fear of each other. Disarmament will have a special significance in the Korean context, since the adversaries are not *potential* enemies but rather parties who were *actually* engaged in deadly warfare not long ago. If each party agreed to eliminate sizable offensive military capability, and if each also agreed to accept international inspection of one sort or another, there is no doubt that the tension between the two would be appreciably diminished.

Further, in the Korean context arms can be considered by each party, not only as a means of external defense, but also as a means to attain national unification. Under present conditions, there is room for each party to legitimate invasion of the other as a step toward unification, not as aggression upon foreign soil, by emphasizing the theme of national liberation rather than external expansion. In this sense, the Korean War was a civil war up to the moment of UN intervention. Accordingly, agreed-upon disarmament on the Korean peninsula would constitute not only a commitment to peaceful *coexistence*, as in other interstate relations, but would also fulfil a pre-requisite for national *unification* by peaceful means. In short, it must be noted that for the Korean people disarmament has crucial and profound political implications which go even beyond the typical disarmament goal of advancing the cause of international peace.

Obviously, disarmament in Korea has significant implications for political economy as well as for political psychology. Overall arms reduction would remove a sizable financial burden, thereby freeing resources for the

improvement of popular living standards. Arms reduction in Korea would also contribute to overcoming the structured international dependence and would thereby enhance Korea's ability to achieve autonomous and equitable economic development.

2. *Autonomous and equitable development*

The initiative for autonomous and equitable development must come from the Korean people, but supplementary tasks can be undertaken by the Western countries, especially the United States and Japan. The creation of a favorable international environment for disarmament, for instance, can promote the conversion of semiwar economies into peace economies in both North and South, thus fulfilling one precondition for autonomous and equitable development.

Being a member of the socialist economic bloc and having already attained a high degree of industrialization on the basis of self-reliance, North Korea will neither need nor accept special 'aid' from the West. What the West should do is not so much to do a favor to her as to eliminate unfavorable and restrictive policies toward her. There will then be room for providing loans and technical know-how and for expanding trade on the basis of mutual interest.

In their relations with South Korea, however, Japan and the United States should probably *curtail* economic ties on various levels. For instance, the 'economic cooperation' extended to South Korea by the United States and Japan has undeniably included support for corrupt structures which serve only small privileged elites. It is imperative for these two countries to critically reappraise the effects of their grants, loans and investments to South Korea. Since it is difficult for Japan, for instance, to investigate the details of how its money has been used in South Korea, the burden of proof should be borne by the Park regime. To the extent that the South Korean government fails to produce convincing evidence that the money has been spent properly, Japan should curtail its capital inflow into South Korea.

Moreover, private Japanese aid – in the form of capital, technical know-how, and industrial materials – has also greatly accelerated the process of integrating South Korea into a system of vertical division of labor – in which export industries expand rapidly at the expense of domestic industrial development – with the result that internal disparities grow wider. This is another area where foreign economic ties should be curtailed. 'Economic cooperation' should be reinforced only where it unquestionably serves to meet basic human needs in the recipient country. However, economic cooperation of this positive type cannot be put into practice unless the

economic system of the donor society itself is oriented toward satisfying the basic needs of its own people. To change the domestic socio-economic structures within the center states in order to change the existing international socio-economic structure is a most significant and fascinating challenge, both intellectual and political, and one that we should squarely face.

3. *Internal liberation*

We have seen that disarmament will help reduce political tensions at the level of symmetric relations between the North and the South; it will also help reduce economic/developmental dependence at the level of asymmetric relations between satellites and center states. In addition, disarmament can bring about a significant change at the domestic political level: it would weaken the power and influence of the military on both sides, and would promote demilitarization of the political regime in South Korea and debureaucratization of the political system in North Korea.

The continued existence of the military regime in South Korea has so far been rationalized in terms of the perceived threat from the North. It is not difficult to foresee, therefore, that as disarmament in the North decreases military pressures and makes that perceived threat far less plausible, the Park regime and its repressive measures will face mounting resistance by the people. If the authoritarian military regime is replaced by a nonmilitarist civilian government more responsive to popular control, this in itself will mitigate the North's distrust and fear of the South. This new condition would help facilitate a meaningful dialogue between the two Koreas. It should be noted that the North-South dialogue, initiated in July 1972, was finally discontinued in August 1973, when the North denounced the South for abducting opposition leader Kim Dae Jung.

Although North Korea is not ruled by a military regime, its political and economic system seems to be considerably militarized under the tense international conditions, as indicated by the high ratio of defense expenditure to GNP. Further, North Korea is no exception to the rigid bureaucratization which characterizes socialist states. To the extent that its bureaucracy has been rendered more inflexible than those in many other socialist regimes, due to the virtually institutionalized cold war on the Korean peninsula, tension reduction and disarmament will contribute to the debureaucratization of North Korean society.

Generally speaking, whereas the initiative for reducing international tensions can be taken by external powers, measures for autonomous socio-economic development should be taken by the people directly concerned. In the economic area, foreign powers should see that they do not obstruct

the efforts of nations to develop on the basis of self reliance. But developed countries can and should also play a more positive role by supporting popular movements in developing countries. The transformation of oppressive regimes is a crucial political precondition for building economic systems which seek to attain autonomous development and to satisfy the basic needs of their peoples. An international reduction of tension which leads to disarmament and demilitarization is one way of promoting democratic modes of governance. Democratic counterpenetration from outside is another.

4. *Democratic counterpenetration*

One of the best examples of democratic counterpenetration (from democratic/developed societies into authoritarian/developing societies) is the transnational movement in support of 'human rights'. Such counter penetration can strengthen opposition forces in South Korea, including social democrats represented by Kim Dae Jung and Christians exemplified by the poet Kim Chi Ha; it can also serve to pave the way for internal liberation and autonomous development. President Carter's defense of 'human rights' has helped to undermine Park's authority, domestically and internationally. More pressure should be brought to bear on Park, not only by the United States, but also by Japan and other countries who subscribe to the principle of human rights.

It is true that the concept of 'human rights' is an ambiguous one, as the language used in Human Rights Conventions amply demonstrates. It is also true that the notion of 'human rights' as espoused by President Carter has a flavor and bias of American liberalism. Nevertheless, whatever the definition given by the sender of the message, the idea of 'human rights' is so general that all recipients will define it in accordance with their own conceptual frameworks and within the contexts of their respective societies. Such a process of 'definition' is already under way in South Korea. To the oppressed and the persecuted there, the term 'human rights' means the right to protest against and resist the government, coupled with the right to demand and implement social change to attain social justice.

It must be noted that oppression in South Korea is so thorough and systematic that dissidents, mostly imprisoned and/or isolated, have practically no other hope but to look for help from abroad, in the form of pressures on the Park regime. One way of responding to their need is to inform them, through the use of common symbols such as 'human rights', that their cause has won widespread moral support abroad.

Another form of democratic counterpenetration involves removing

legitimacy and moral support from the oppressive elite group which obstructs the development of democracy in Korean society. For example, private citizens, mass media and responsible political leaders can systematically obtain and publicize information on the activities of the transnational political-business 'complex'. The impact of Congressional disclosures concerning the activities of South Korean agents in the United States and of the Lockheed Corporation's unlawful transactions are cases in point. Through these Congressional investigations, valuable information was made available on the existence and functioning of a transnational network that cuts across the United States, Japan and South Korea.

In order to promote democratic counterpenetration abroad, societies which call for the democratization of South Korea must reinforce democracy at home. No democracy can maintain itself without free access to information on the way its power structure works. By pressuring their governments to acquire and release relevant information, the people of the United States and Japan will be activating and even reforming their own democracies.

Admittedly, citizens of the Western liberal democracies (including Japan) have a tremendous advantage over those who live in developing societies under authoritarian regimes with regard to the ability to ascertain the truth about how the power structure works. This privilege entails transnational responsibility. The people of the developed societies should therefore take the initiative for undermining the 'complex', by disclosing information about its operation. By so doing, they will have created a basis for solidarity with oppressed peoples in developing countries.

We have examined major components of the strategy of peaceful transformation-tension reduction, autonomous and equitable development, internal liberation and democratic counterpenetration. These elements can be interrelated and incorporated into a coherent strategy as follows:



Seen from a world order perspective, this chart indicates that citizens of developed societies can and should pursue transnational solidarity with those in developing societies, primarily at the political level and, probably

only secondarily, at the economic level, in the form of political support given to the indigenous agents of social transformation.

VIII. Conclusion: prospects

Korea is a victim of East–West conflict in a twofold sense. On the one hand, it was almost irrevocably divided by the superpowers as the conflict intensified. On the other, it was almost totally forgotten by most of the people in the world as the conflict receded.

It is only natural that the Korean people should profoundly distrust external powers. This distrust is particularly notable, of course, in North Korea's long years of diplomatic seclusion. North Korea's persistent opposition to the simultaneous admission of both Koreas to the United Nations can be attributed, first, to the contest over legitimacy ('who represents Korea?') and, second, to the distrust derived from historical experience that internationally agreed upon divisions of Korea have a way of becoming permanent even when they were originally intended to be provisional. The line of demarcation along the 38th parallel was a case in point, as was the division of Vietnam in 1954 along the 17th parallel. Was there any alternative left for Vietnam but to achieve unification by force of arms? Thus, in North Korean eyes any international arrangement which permits North and South to coexist may well threaten to perpetuate the division. But it is also true that North Korean rigidity may appear to South Korea and the West as a manifestation of militant intent. Therefore, if North Korea is committed to unification by peaceful means, it should take a more flexible stand. And to promote the necessary degree of flexibility in North Korea, the West should demonstrate its flexibility by taking the initiative for reducing existing political tensions.

Despite the tragic division of the nation, or precisely because of it, there seems to be a national consensus across the 38th parallel that the highest priority should be given to two political goals – 'peace' and 'unification'. However, this dual priority immediately raises two very difficult questions: How can we attain unification without committing a breach of peace? and, How can we attain peace without sacrificing unification? This is probably the most serious dilemma confronting the Korean people; it is a dilemma that cannot be resolved by the Korean people alone. As we have observed, the Korean problem by nature cannot be solved without external initiative and transnational support.

Unification does not seem attainable in the near future. It is, however,

crucial to set in motion a process which pursues the long term goal of unification, instead of perpetuating the division through an incessant arms race.

North Korea is a highly self-reliant industrialized state, while South Korea is highly dependent on foreign trade. In this respect, the North and the South represent polar extremes in terms of the mode of development. The main reason the two Koreas have come to differ so much from each other, however, is the division of the peninsula, which prevented mutual cooperation in the task of nation-building. The reduction of tension in Korea will pave the way for North and South to enhance their interdependence and cooperation, as well as competition. If the people of the two Koreas—one capitalist, the other socialist—are so ingenious as to create a political setting in which their systems can be synthesized, their achievement will have highly significant implications for the rest of the world. Again, however, it must be stressed that as long as a purely Korean initiative remains unfeasible, the primary responsibility for encouraging a radical shift in Korea's development should be borne by non-Koreans dedicated to the realization of world-order values.

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